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Contraception and the Contralife Will 
R. A. Connor 
Father Connor received his Ph. D. 
in philosophy from the Lateran Uni-
versity in Rome. He points out that 
"Intending the good is a subjective 
operation deriving from an intel-
lectual objective perception of being. 
The being that I perceive is the esse of 
my personal self which is thrusting to 
fulfillment through acts. The person 
and his / her acts are the grounding of 
what I mean by "good" or "bad". The 
evil of contraception, then is not an 
intention against the life of a future 
child. but the nonconformity of the 
will with the double structure (love-
making / life giving) of the coital act 
which is a manifestation of the 
intercoursing process. 
"The evident weakness of the contralife will shows in the inabilil.l' to 
apply it uniformly throughout sexual morality. For example. in in vitro 
fertilization. the will is pro-life. yet the "manufacturing" of the child is evil. 
They then have recourse to other principles ad hoc." 
John Ford, S.J., Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis and 
William Mayl have given us a defense of"Humanae Vitae" by affirming the 
evil of contraception to be the contra-life will against the future child 2 They 
say: "We think . .. that while contraception is wrong for several reasons, it is 
wrong primarily and essentially because it is contralife."3 I would like to 
make a brief critique of that position suggesting that it is a disguised 
subjectivism. The authors seem to have put the full burden of moral 
evaluation on the intention of the will as contralife or prolife. I would like to 
propose that the evaluation of the moral theory of"Humanae Vitae" would 
be better served by a grounding in the objectivity of the Thomistic esse of 
the person which would permit explaining, rather than bypassing, the 
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reasoning put forth by "Humanae Vitae" itself in the non-separability 
principle: love-making cannot be separated from life-giving. 
I think clarity would be served better by a presentation of the 
metaphysical position first. "Humanae Vitae" establishes its argument 
against contraception on the inseparability principle: "each and every 
marriage act (quilibet matrimonii usus) must remain open to the 
transmission of life."4 I am not arguing here that the conclusions of 
"Humanae Vitae" take their authority to demand assent from the 
arguments therein. They do not. However, I would like to point out that the 
argument which is used is an argument from the realism of nature, and the 
being of persons and the acts that they engage in. I would also like to point 
out that realism is an epistemological axiom which presumes the objectivity 
of truth. It is intimately connected with the acknowledgment of a 
transcendent God while at the same time being the grounding perspective of 
Western civilization.s 
Esse as Ground of the Good 
Now, we should ask: what is the traditional realist argument with regard 
to moral goodness? In the metaphysically grounded ethics of St. Thomas, 
goodness is identical with act which perfects being to be more in actuality 
what it is . If one is man, then it is good to be more a man. If man is a person 
who is capable of love, then it is better to love than not to love. Morality is 
the obligation issued by the Divine Command to the free being: "Become 
who you are!" " '(I)t happens that the reason naturally seizes as a good 
everything toward which man has a natural inclination.' The good, then, is 
that toward which the real naturally moves; but this is its own realization. 
The good is the real fulfilled in being; the good is the real at the goal of its 
movement."6 
By act we ultimately mean esse. 
It will be very important, then, to show what we mean by act, since the 
notion of act is going to have to bear the burden of explaining what we 
mean by good . To this end I will have recourse to the Thomistic 
understanding of "to be", esse, and the configuration esse will take due to 
the limiting function of essence, or the form , in the hopes of explaining the 
realist grounding of moral obligation. By "limiting configuration", I mean 
the particular kind of being limited esse becomes. Esse is not the mere 
"facticity" of an essence or a subject but is, rather, all the actuality and 
intelligibility there is in a being. That the being be a man who will tend to 
love and that the particular act of love-making "should" always be open to 
giving life is what I mean by configuration of esse. If esse were not limited to 
this or that configuration, it would be God, unlimited esse and hence 
incapable or moral activity because there would be no deprivation of act or 
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perfection present. There would be no good to be achieved . There is no 
"should" in God. 
St. Thomas says that, "the good is that which is desirable. And so, since 
every nature desires its esse and its perfection, it is necessary to say that esse 
and the perfection of any nature whatsoever have the meaning of 
goodness."7 The act of existence (esse) is understood by St. Thomas as the 
perfection of all perfections, act of all acts. There cannot be any actuality or 
perfection of any kind which is not "to be" itself.8 And so the good is the 
actuality of existence at the goal of its movement of becoming. Here I would 
like to rehearse Gilson's understanding of being in St. Thomas with regard 
to the dynamic of becoming, because it is the esse, in its expansiveness as the 
act of acts which tends to achieve itself, i.e., to become itself within the 
profile of a particular essence. Again , it is the esse that is the root- of all 
goodness. Gilson says: 
Not to be, then to act, but: to be is to act. And the very first thing which 'to be' 
does , is to make its own essence to be , that is to be a being. This is done at once, 
completely and definitively , for , between to be and not to be, there is no 
intermediate position. But the next thing which 'to be' does , is to begin bringing its 
own individual essence somewhat nearer its completion. It begins doing it all at 
once, but the work will take time and, in the case of such corporeal beings as men , 
for instance, it is bound to be a slow process. It takes each of us a lifetime to achieve 
his own temporal individuality. True enough, essence itself is there from the very 
beginning, and, in a way, it is whole , but its wholeness is not that of a thing ... . In 
short , the actual perfecting of essences is the final cause of their existences, and it 
takes many operations to achieve it. 
Existence can perform those operations. Because 10 be is act , it also is to be able 
to act. 9 
By good, I ultimately mean esse. 
If this is true, then the act of being, esse would be the ultimate grounding 
of whatever I mean by "good", i.e., by the act of knowing, loving and doing, 
I am more man, more in act, more "to be". I am better, i.e., more in act, than 
before my esse was actualized from a less intense and relational state lO to 
what it is now, i.e., I am more intensely I and I am more far reaching 
relationally by knowing and loving, particularly if I am knowing and loving 
the greatest of objects, God Himself. This state of actuality toward which I 
tend has traditionally been called "good". The act of existence would be 
achieving itself according to the specific limitation or intensification of it 
which is called essence. This limitation (essence) would be the goal to be 
achieved . I am a man, not a tree or a rock. The act of existence which I am, 
at this very moment of writing, is not fully achieved as a man, much less, me. 
I must know more and better. I must love more and better. And I must 
direct my knowing and loving to the supreme object of knowing and loving, 
i.e., God. I must become who I am. Matter would be the principle which 
makes space and time possible so that, as an incomplete being, the finite esse 
that a person is, could actualize himself/ herself by expanding in knowledge 
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and love and intensifying as a self. 
Moral objects and the good are determined by esse. 
Now, the kinds of acts towards which esse tends in its labor of actualizing 
itselffully, and of course, freely, according to the pattern of the essence, e.g., 
worshipping God, honoring parents, respecting life, goods, sexuality, 
truthfulness, etc. become what we call "moral objects" and are the criteria as 
to whether a particular action is good or not. The moral object is one of the 
principal criteria St. Thomas chooses for determining the morality of an 
action. He says: "The primary goodness of a moral action is derived from its 
suitable object."11 It responds to the question, what are you doing? The 
realism involved here is that some moral objects are intrinsically good 
because they are clear manifestations of the thrusting of esse in its becoming 
more actualized. 
The intention is determined by the object. 
There is another determinant of the morality of an action which is the 
interior act of the will which is the intention. It responds to the question, 
why are you doing it? So important is this determinant that even if an action 
were good because of its object, such as almsgiving, it would be a bad action 
ifthe intention were bad, e.g., if you were looking for praise and position by 
the giving of alms. Germane to the purpose of this paper, then, the question 
must be raised as to what determines the goodness or badness of intention. 
Now, if we have been able to establish that the intrinsic goodness or 
badness of an act is determined by its object, which, in turn, is established by 
the thrust of the developing esse, on what do I ground the goodness and 
badness of why we do such and so? To make the question clearer and more 
pertinent, since intention is an act of the will, is goodness or badness 
intrinsic to the intention of the will, or is it somehow derived from the kind 
of object the person is intending? Is the will simply good or bad in its 
intending?, i.e., does it have intuitive goods and evils as part of its make-up? 
In answer, St. Thomas states that 
the goodness of the will depends properly on the object. Now the will's object is 
proposed to it by reason. Because the good understood is the proportionate object 
of the will ... Therefore. the goodness of the will depends on reason. in the same 
way as it depends on the object. 12 
This basically is to say that the goodness of the will is derived from the 
kind of act that the intellect, perceptive to the thrusting of esse, presents to 
the will and which the will intends.13 Now, there is normally a double 
intention of the will in any given moral act: the intention of the object of the 
act here and now, and the intention I propose to myselffor doing the act in 
the first place. 14 I intend to give alms; and I intend to give alms so as to look 
good before men. Now, we saw above that the intention of the act is 
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determined by the object of the act . That is , the intention will be good if the 
object of the act, the moral object, the act embodying the thrusting of the 
esse of the person is good. If almsgiving is good, my intending to give alms is 
good. Now, the second intention, the why of the action, the end, the 
ultimate purpose that I secretly harbor in my mind and heart, is also 
determined in its moral goodness by the object which it intends. IS 
Therefore, if I am seeking personal glorification by the giving of alms, it is a 
bad act by virtue of the objective disorder of self seeking. The point I am 
trying to make , is that the goodness or badness of intention are not intrinsic 
to the intention, but are derived from the objective world of being that the 
will intends. I want to establish that there is no such thing as a "good" or 
"bad" intention in itself but rather intentions of "good" or "bad" kinds of 
action. Intentions have derived values.16 A what is always the foundation of 
a why. This sets the stage for understanding that G BFM perhaps have it 
backwards and that it is not the contralife will which makes contraception 
bad , but the nature of the contraceptive act which makes the intention bad . 
Let us let the authors set the stage. 
Good as Ungrounded and Underived 
The thesis that GBFM propose for the moral evaluation of contraception · 
consists in the evil of the act being derived from the contralife will. That is, 
contraception is wrong because it goes against the future child. In their 
minds, contraception and homicide are equivalent evils, not because they 
both offend grievously against the natural and divine laws, but because they 
offend against the same object, i.e ., the living person , or "the basic good of 
life", as they would say it: 17 "(contraception) is a practical (though not 
necessari ly an emotional) hatred of the possible baby they project and reject 
... In short, contraception is similar to deliberate homicide , despite their 
important differences, precisely inasmuch as both involve a contralife 
will. "18 The authors remove the word "transmission"19 from the definition 
of contraception in "Humanae Vitae" (as quoted above) which emphasizes 
the nature of the conjugal act as the moral determinant and clearly and 
forcefully puts the burden of proof of rightness or wrongness on the 
intentional ity of the will. I believe that the interpretation of the authors is so 
forced that it depends upon an emendation of the very text of "Humanae 
Vitae". 
The philosophy underlying this position can be found in Grisez's analysis 
of SI. Thomas's presentation of The First Principle of Practical Reason in 
I-II, Question 94, Article 2,20 It is here that Grisez lays the groundwork for 
the autonomy of the practical intellect from all speculative considerations: 
" ... to get moral principles from metaphysics, it is not from the is of nature 
to the ought of nature that one must go ... it is no solution to argue that 
one can derive the "ought" of moral judgment from the "is" of ethical 
evaluation: ... Good is to be done and pursued. and evil is 10 be avoided. 
together with the other self-evident princi pies of naturalla w, are not derived 
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from any statements offact. They are principles. They are not derived from 
any statements at all. They are not derived from prior principles. They are 
underivable."21 I believe that we are witnessing the split of the intellect into 
theoretical and practical with the practical intellect autonomous unto 
itself.22Jt is here that the "goods" are co-relative with the first principles and 
themselves stand underived and self evident. They seem to be part and 
parcel of the practical intellect as (Grisez suggested earlier in the article) 
solubility is a property of sugar23 
Perhaps we could make a small incision here to show how diametrically 
opposed Grisez is to a realistic ethic and a faithful interpretation of St. 
Thomas. He says : 
Our willing of ends requires knowledge of them. and the directive knowledge prior 
to the natural movements of our will is precisely the basic principles of practical 
reason. At any rate this is Aquinas' theory."" 
Now, if what we have said above is true, i.e., the "good" is that act or state 
of actuality toward which a limited being tends, (and in a broad sense, we 
want to include "willing" under the rubric of "tending"), then there is no 
such thing as a "good" prior to inclination (tending or willing). As we can 
see at the beginning of the Summa Theologiae: "The essence of goodness 
consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. ''25 Therefore, there is no 
"directive knowledge prior to the natural movements of our will" as there 
are not "basic principles of practical reason" prior to inclination. If there 
were, then you would have ungrounded, self-evident "goods" underived 
from the perception of the dynamism of real being. And you would have 
effectively separated the intellect into theoretical and practical. And, if I 
may make the illation, that separation is tantamount to establishing 
theoretical subjectivism. I believe such to be the case with Grisez. 
Grisez goes on to say that St. Thomas "maintains that there is no willing 
without prior apprehension" and quotes I , q. 82, a. 4, ad 3 where St. 
Thomas says something quite different: 
every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension , whereas every 
apprehension is nOI preceded bl' an aCI of lhe will." 
But the critical point here is that there are, as we have just seen in I , q. 5, a. 
I, c., some apprehensions that are preceded by an act of the will , i.e. , the 
good which is being, perceived as desirable, which is such an apprehension. 
Grisez goes on to argue in the same paragraph that: "The precepts of natural 
law, at least the first principle of practical reason, must be antecedent to all 
acts of our will." (emphasis added). The rest of the article continues in the 
same vein of equivocation as to the meaning of St. Thomas with regard to 
the first principles of the practical intellect. One thing is clear, however: for 
Grisez, the good is the direct object of perception by the practical intellect 
and is underived from any theoretical considerations ofthe being of reality. 
Returning to our concrete consideration of contraception, we are told 
that life,26 i.e. , the child , is one of these goods which is a self evident 
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apprehension of the practical intellect; hence, the moral reasoning that the 
evil of contraception is the will or intention against the good which is the 
child. 
The Conjugal Act, Not the Child, Is the Object of Intention 
Now, with the realist / metaphysical analysis of good as act produced by a 
person ("esse-becoming") on the one hand, and the Grisez analysis of good 
as underivedfrom being on the other, let us see once again what "Humanae 
Vitae" says explicitly in # II : 
Each a nd eve ry marriage act ("qualsiasi a tto matrimoniale" . as written in the 
original Italian ve rsion ; qui/ibet matrimonii usus in the Latin translation) must 
remain open ("aperto alia transmissione della vi ta"; per se destinatusj to the 
transmission of life. 
I believe this statement represents the terms in which not only contraception 
is immoral, but it is presenting the criterion for the moral evaluation of all 
sexual activity: the openness of each and every marriage act to the 
transmission of life. Notice, the document explicitly establishes the act, with 
its double dimension of love-making /l ife-giving, as the criterion of all 
sexual moral evaluation, beginning with contraception. We also saw that 
the position of G BFM puts contraception squarely within the interiority of 
the agent as being "essentially a contra-life will" (p. 40). They separate 
contraception from any relationship to the sexual act < "Assuming 
contraception is a sin, it is not a sexual sin" (p . 41», and finally conclude 
that : "Contraception can be defined only in terms of the beliefs, intentions, 
and choices that render behavior contraceptive" (p. 41). They even go so far 
as to say that 
This definition 2) makes it clear that contraception is only contingent/r related to 
marital intercourse. For the definition of contraception neither includes norentai/s 
that one \\'ho does it engages in sexual intercourse, much less marital intercourse. 
Therefore. if someone both engages in a sex ual act and contracepts. the two are 
distinct acts (r. 42). 
The point here is that the criterion of morality is intrinsic to the will , i.e. , 
the intending of the life of the child, a nd underived from any metaphysical 
considerations such as reality itself. There is simply no derivation of ought 
from is. The morality of the act does not depend on the nature of the act but 
on the intention of the life of the child. 
A Critique of the authors' position. 
Now, according to the text and mora l rea son ing of"Humanae Vitae" # 11 
as well as axiomatic realism in mora l analysis, I do not believe we are 
talking of the child as the criterion of morality in contraception. As we saw, 
there may be a double intention in the performance of an act; that of the act 
itself28 , and that of an ulterior purpose for performing the act29. This 
ulterior intentionality could destroy the moral goodness of the act and hence 
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it seems to lend support to what GBFM roundly affirm; i.e., that it is the 
contralife intention which makes contraception to be a bad act. But there 
are two considerations that militate against it. 
One. the morality of the intention is always determined by the kind of 
action we are talking about, whether it be the proximate intention of the act 
itself or the remote intention of the end which the agent purposes. If it is a 
good kind of action, it is a good intention. And the kind of action is 
determined by the nature of the being we are dealing with. The moral 
evaluation is always derived. And, again, this holds true for both intentions, 
that ofthe act and that of the end. For both intentions, the "what" explains 
the moral quality of the "why". 
Dr. Janet E. Smith voices this same point concerning contraception as 
contra-life in her forthcoming book on contraception (Appendix 4, p. 10). 
She says: 
Grisez seems to lose sight of the traditional understanding that the will becomes 
evil when it wills an evil act and that the evil of acts - at lesat those considered 
intrinsically immoral - can be assessed apart from and prior to knowledge of 
what the agent wills. It is because the agent intends to do an action that is evil that 
he has an evil will ; it is not because he has an evil will that his external action is evil 
(in fact. on occasion the external act may be good while the will is evil.) A more 
traditional formulation would state that 'The malice of contraception is in the 
intention because the will intends to do an action that is intrinsically evil and the 
goodness or evil of the will depends primarily upon the object of the act.' As we 
shall see in our consideration of Grisez's latest explanation of the malice of 
contraception . Grisez seems to place the malice ever more exclusively in the will. 
When considering that explanation, i.e. , that the will becomes evil when 
intending an evil act. Dr. Smith observes that GBFM 
seem most reluctant to state that contraception is wrong because it is a contralife 
act; they persist in locating the evil in the will. In their view. since to have a 
contralife will is wrong. contraception (since it involves a contralife) is wrong. But 
this seems to be backward. It ",auld seem to be because contraception is an action 
that is contrali(e that one v. ·ho intends itIor what it is could be said to have a 
contrali(e will. (emphasis added"lo 
It may be helpful to show that the claim that the evil of an action resides 
primarily in the will seems to conflict with received Catholic teaching. Let 
me cite the famous passage from "Gaudium et Spes," #51: 
When it is a question of harmonizing married love with the responsible 
transmission of life . it is not enough to take only the good intention and the 
evaluation of motives into account; the objective criteria must be used, criteria 
drawn fro m the nature of the human person and human action. criteria which 
respect the total meaning of mutual self-giving and human procreation in the 
context of true love; 
Two. to have a contralife will does not vitiate the moral quality of the 
conjugal act. Let us rehearse that a bit. 
As long as the conjugal act is intended as the act it is (love-making and 
openness to the transmission of life), the will can be ultimately contralife, 
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without making a good conjugal act bad for that reason. Why? Because 
there is a built-in sterility, a window in the act which can be taken advantage 
offor serious reasons but which does not negate the procreative orientation 
of the act. The non-intending of children does not necessarily violate the 
kind of act intercourse is . "The act they perform is a generative sort of act: 
even if it has not a procreative function (because of its being infertile), it 
nevertheless maintains its procreative meaning. If this act, for natural 
reasons beyond intention, cannot have procreative efficiency, this does not 
alter what one intentionally does (what one chooses) as long as one did not 
do (choose) anything for preventing procreation.") I That means that a 
couple may not want children but they do nothing to prevent them. They 
engage freely in the conjugal act and take what comes. We could say that the 
intentionality for life, as the "procreative meaning", is embedded in the very 
nature of the act as flowing from the esse of the conjugal partners . It is in the 
physiology of the act. (And this is not physicalism since the body pertains to 
the person as an expression of the person.) The physiology of sex and 
reproduction is an expression of the dynamics of the persons. Or, for a 
proportionally grave reason, they positively do not want children now, and 
they discipline themselves to practice NFP. They struggle energetically and 
ascetically discipline themselves to show love for each other in other ways, 
limiting the use of the conjugal act to the infertile periods. They have a 
contralife will here and now and, indeed, positively grow in holiness with 
it32 . We could say that the intentionality for the child is within the act itself. 
But that does not make the child the object of the intention of the moral 
agent.)) Rather, the child is excluded as the intention of the conjugal 
partners. But he or she is included in the overall meaning of the conjugal act 
which would make him l her the object of the intention of God by the very 
overall orientation (intentio Dei) of the conjugal act. We enter here into the 
distinction of the finis operis and the finis operantis. The act of the persons , 
then, as mutual self-giving, love-making, is the object of the first intention, 
the finis operantis. The openness to the transmission of life inscribed in the 
act itself as an embodiment of the esse-becoming of the persons is the finis 
operis which is the second intention. And the moral rightness of that act 
depends, not on the intention of having a child. which would be the third 
intention, but on whether the act of intercourse is performed according to 
its nature . The conjugal act, as the enfleshed performance of the mutual 
self-giving of the persons with its inherent ope'nness to life, is the object of 
intention and the criterion of sexual morality. 
As we saw, there are two objects of intention in the act: to make love and 
to be open to the child . As we just saw, there are three . The first two are 
involved in the conjugal act itself as love-making and life-giving, as 
dimensions of the act, and the third , which we analyzed above, which is the 
child himself. Again, the point being made, is that the intention against the 
child does not render the intended naturally sterile act wrong, provided 
there is an objectively serious and proportionate "reason". Again, the word 
"reason" here means a further "intention" (a fourth) obviously pointing 
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to an objective grounding in being which would justify not wanting the child 
here and now. Therefore, it seems that the position of Grisez et al. does not 
stand up to an analysis of intention as being grounded in being nor to the 
moral validity of NFP. 
Attention must be turned from the intention, or the contralife will , to the 
nature of the act to morally evaluate contraception . It is true , as we saw 
above, that the morality of the external act depends on the will, the "heart", 
the intention. But the will, heart and intention are in turn determined, are 
made "good" if, what is interiorly willed, yearned for and intended , is 
objectively an act perfective of real existing persons. The child may be 
intended along with the proper performance of the conjugal act, but it is not 
the intending of the child which makes the act moral , but the intending of 
the openness while intending the love act. 
My discrepancy with the authors is not their conclusions which, in fact, 
conform, albeit contingently, with the reality of things and the teaching of 
the Church. Rather, if I may borrow a phrase from Dr. Janet Smith, it is 
with "the technicalities a/moral analysis. i.e. , on the relation of the malice 
of the will to the evil of the external act and on what role nature plays in this 
analysis."34 
Incompatibility of invincible ignorance with intention as sole moral 
criterion. 
In the case of invincible ignorance, agai n, it is Dr. Janet Smith who 
suggests that we also consider the sadly universal situation where 
uninformed and erroneously counseled women may use contraceptives 
oblivious to any objective moral wrongdoing. They are invincibly ignorant 
and presume that, since they are generally open to life or are concerned 
about the "quality of life", they can and "should" use contraceptives. 
Indeed, they may have a contraceptive will in this act, but then we are not 
talking about a contra-life will but a will that is contra nalUram. That is, 
they will life , but not now in this act. This is also a refutation of the basic 
thesis of the authors. If a person is in invincible ignorance and performs the 
objectively sinful act of contraception, which has the objective negative 
results of preventing both the complete giving of self in the conjugal act 
because the union of egg and seed is withheld, and also simultaneously 
impedes the conception of a child , they are clearly doing something wrong. 
But it is not because they intend it . but because they are ignorant of it. True, 
there is no formal evil norant of it. True, there is no formal evil being done , 
but there is certainly material evil and damage. This can only be imputed to 
the violation of the nature of the act, not the intention. 
Moral situations highlighting the act as moral criterion. 
Let us now consider a series of situations, e.g., the mirror image of 
contraception which is artificial insemination. There is an explicit intention 
for the child , but we do not have the act of love whereby the child is 
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engendered. 35 I would submit this as a devastating argument against the 
intention of the will as the ultimate grounding of the morality of the act. 
Here you have a completely pro-life will while totally bypassing the act of 
intercourse. The act is censured in the strongest terms by the highest 
magisterium of the Church. 
Or again, let us consider the case of homosexuality, where what is absent 
is an act which should be "a complementary union, able to transmit life".36 
Homosexuals are incapable of total self-giving which can occur only in 
marriage. "Sexual intercourse between homosexuals cannot represent total 
self-giving because they are not able , by the very fact of their being of the 
same sex , to give their fertility to one another."37 
Or we may have the couple who has the intention of the child, but not in 
every single act of intercourse. The overall intentionality is life and children, 
but not, say, in this act here and now. I would again submit that it is not the 
intention for the child that determines the morality of the act, but the act 
itself as perfective of the dimensions of personhood, viz. , love-making/ life-
giving. The physical act itself, as the bodily expression of the persons, is the 
principal determinant of morality because the body "is a constitutive part of 
the person who manifests and expresses himself/ herself through it. 
Therefore, the 'natural moral law' (recall that this refers to the truth about 
what it means to be a human person, the 'law of personhood') also applies to 
what is done to and by the human body. It requires that bodily acts not 
violate the dignity of personhood . That is, it requires that the physical acts 
of the human being respect the reality of personhood as gift. What is done to 
a human body is done directly or indirectly to a human person. Therefore, 
although the 'natural moral law' is not a biological law, it requires that 
human beings direct and regulate their bodily behavior, so as to be faithful 
to their nature as persons. The Instruction applies this requirement to the 
'bio-spiritual' act of human procreation."38 
Therefore, the moral criterion for all sexual activity is not "life" as the 
good , but the "esse-becoming", or if you will, the nature of the intercoursing 
married male and female persons which issue in a "bio-spiritual" act of 
intercourse.39 Contraception would be wrong because there is no openness 
to the transmission of life in the act. Artificial insemination would be wrong 
because there would be no act of union. Homosexuality would be wrong 
because there is no possibility for an act which could be a procreative 
(fertile) giving of self. Sporadic contraceptive acts concomitant with a 
general openness to children would be wrong because each act is a human 
act and therefore free . It is for this reason that the Church, in her explicit 
teaching,40 insists that "each and every marriage act must remain open to 
the transmission of life." And so it is the act which embodies the moral 
object insofar as it (the act) is the expression of "esse-becoming" of the 
persons. And, again, this act is not a mere external physicalism of biological 
laws, but is, rather, the act of bodies which are the enfleshment of persons. 
And so the bodily act is a person-act with the morality of personhood 
inscribed within it. 
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If life is proposed as the criterion by GBFM, it is proposed as a 
consequence. What we may have here is a full blown consequentialism 
which is masked and "impeded" by simply stonewalling it; i.e., declaring the 
goods to be "incommensurable", to be absolutes. This is done simply by 
platonizing them, lifting them out of the contingency of real situations. This 
in turn is done by bypassing the act itself and, of course, the "esse-
becoming" of persons on whom the act depends. The reality of the moral 
agent and the reality of situations is simply taken out of play in order to 
avoid situationism and an ethic of consequences. The logical result is that 
there can be no prudential judgment, say, concerning life . For example, war 
and capital punishment would be ipso facto immoral if life , not person-acts, 
be the criterion of morality. 
I opened a parenthesis when I made a brief presentation of Grisez's mind 
concerning the underived nature of the "goods" and the first principles of 
the practical intellect. I would like to close that parenthesis by explicitly 
affirming that my making the "esse-becoming" of the persons and the 
ensuing conjugal act the moral object of all sexual activity, I am affirming 
the continuity - the identity - of the theoretical and the practical intellect. 
And I am using the word "derived" in a wider sense than Grisez. I am not 
just talking about secondary principles of natural law being "derived" from 
primary principles. I am suggesting that the entire content of the intellect, as 
theoretical and practical , is derived; that the intellect is nothing with regard 
to reality prior to its being informed by being. That is , without the 
perception of a being, there would be no theoretical principles of identity, 
causality, etc. And without the perception in the self of the dynamic of esse 
reaching toward its fulfilled actualization, the intellect would not even be 
practical. There would not be any first practical principle such as "good is to 
be done and evil avoided" because it is axiomatic that the intellect perceive 
only act, and that it call "good" only that further actuality and perfection 
toward which act tends . "Good" as such is not self-evident to the practical 
intellect divorced from the theoretical perception of being-becoming. 
"Good", "ought", the first principles of the natural law such as: "good 
should be done and evil avoided", etc ., are not innate to the practical 
intellect. This is axiomatic to realism. On this fundamental point let Grisez's 
position be clear. He says: "The basic precepts of natural law are no less part 
of the mind's original equipment than are the evident principles of 
theoretical knowledge. Ought requires no special act legitimatizing it; ought 
rules its own domain by its own authority, an authority legitimate as that of 
any is'' .4 1 
Conclusion 
G BFM no doubt, see their work as a first line defense against relativism 
(in the form of consequentialism or proportionalism or situationism). We 
have to thank them for this. They are giving us an absolute by affirming the 
"goods" as "incommensurables", but perhaps at the price of losing a 
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grounding in reality. My disagreements with GBFM are not about the 
strength of their moral reasoning, nor the truth of the conclusions they 
reach . As Dr. Janet Smith says: "I find them both strong and true." The real 
problem is the moral reasoning as to whether good or evil are inherent to the 
will or grounded on being. I proposed at the beginning of the paper that the 
position of GBFM is ultimately an epistemological problem of the 
derivation of the "goods". The authors reject this derivation. I submit that 
this is a disguised subjectivism. They would not agree, however. This is not 
because they are theoretically realists, but because the intellect cannot help 
thinking in an essentially realisitc way,42 and they perceive themselves as 
realists . Theoretically, however, they have distanced themselves from 
realism with the separation of "ought" from "is" and have made the "goods" 
a dimension, "equipment"43 of the practical intellect. This is idealism. And 
idealism is ultimately ethical subjectivism. Commenting on this type of 
procedure, E. Gilson commented: "Thus one must be also cautious to turn 
himself away from any speculation on 'values' . Values (read here the 
"goods") are nothing other than transcendentals which have separated 
themselves from being and try to substitute themselves for it. The 'founding 
of values' thus becomes an obsession for the idealist; but for the realist , 
nothing."44 
Therefore , I think ethical theory would be better served by a re-
evaluation of St. Thomas's esse or as I am suggesting, "esse-becoming", i.e., 
the person, as the ultimate ground of realism, which, as finite outside of 
God , is , in some respect, absolute in itself, as the act of existence, yet still 
contingent, becoming itself and always in a context and a situation. The 
"esse-becoming" is the grounding of the nature of the conjugal act which is 
the centerpiece of all sexual morality. In this wise, we have an absolute 
reality-in context that must be evaluated in a prudential judgment in order 
to determine what is good here and now. If we bypass esse, we run the risk of 
seeking an absolute in idealistic terms, (the goods), and in this case, the 
child , and building an ethic of intentionality around it which cannot end in 
other than subjectivism and ideology. 
Perhaps we could profit from the experience of Josef Pieper: 
It was 28 August 1924. Goethe's birthday - which is why I cannot possibly forget 
the date . . . At that very moment . all the ideas which had long been striving to 
achieve structural unity in the murk y ferment of toilsome reflection suddenly 
crystallized as if under magical influence. All at once I was able to put my confused 
intimations into clear words: "Every ought is grounded in an is ; the good is what 
corresponds to reality." If anyone wants to know and do the good, he must direct 
his gaze to the objective world of being; not to his own mind, not to his own 
conscience, not to values, nor to ideals or paradigms he has himself drawn up . He 
must look away from his own act and toward reality.4s 
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